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Abstract
I have been asked to make a few remarks regarding Arthur Laby’s presentation, but, as every-
one knows, it is very hard to discuss anything with the Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”).
As far as I can see, the conceptual interplay of ‘disclosure versus substantive rules,‘ or rather —
in its historical order — ‘substantive rules versus disclosure,‘ has not yet been widely discussed in
Europe. Let me first set out what I mean by the two approaches as there are probably differences
of definition between the United States and Europe, and, indeed, my understanding differs a bit
from the one presented by my colleague, Mr. Laby. Let me try a rough definition: the substantive
rule concept encompasses not only rules for disclosure of sufficient information to the client, but
also requires that intermediaries owe further duties to the client in good faith. The client must be
‘tutored,‘ even though the degree of such tutoring is subject to a variety of opinions.
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I have been asked to make a few remarks regarding Arthur
Laby's presentation, but, as everyone knows, it is very hard to
discuss anything with the Securities Exchange Commission
("SEC"). As far as I can see, the conceptual interplay of "disclo-
sure versus substantive rules," or rather-in its historical order-
"substantive rules versus disclosure," has not yet been widely dis-
cussed in Europe. Let me first set out what I mean by the two
approaches as there are probably differences of definition be-
tween the United States and Europe, and, indeed, my under-
standing differs a bit from the one presented by my colleague,
Mr. Laby. Let me try a rough definition: the substantive rule
concept encompasses not only rules for disclosure of sufficient
information to the client, but also requires that intermediaries
owe further duties to the client in good faith. The client must be
"tutored," even though the degree of such tutoring is subject to
a variety of opinions.
Substantive rules require that a financial institution take a
"protective" attitude. This situation is not always easy to describe
in legal terms, but it conveys the idea that because the profes-
sional has superior knowledge and information, he must refrain
from making use of these advantages to the detriment of his
more simple client. A special legal relationship is somehow cre-
ated that also prohibits the use of conflicts of interest to the det-
riment of the client. The concept of disclosure means, above all,
providing sufficient information to permit a reasonable person
to form a reasoned judgement. It is a kind of standardized ap-
proach, and it seems to me closer to market ideas, as an in-
formed public makes better decisions.
In my view, both approaches are underpinned by the basic
assumptions that prudential supervision cares for the soundness
of financial institutions, such as in capital rules and credit rules,
and that the responsible individuals within institutions are "fit
and proper." The ideal situation of exclusive control through
markets is still too remote to be seriously discussed and this
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reduces to some degree the impact of disclosure rule concepts. I
might add here that a worldwide harmonization of such substan-
tive rules is occurring within the Basle Committee on Banking
Supervision' and the International Organisation of Securities
Commissions ("IOSCO"). There should be no doubt, however,
that markets themselves are an effective means of control.
Justice Louis D. Brandeis' words, "[s]unlight is said to be
the best of disinfectants," from his early work Other People's Money
and How the Bankers Use It,2 have been quoted often. It seems to
me that these words were, at the time, considered amusing
rather than setting an early foundation for a belief in the "grown
up" or even "enlightened investor," miindiger Anleger, who domi-
nates the present scenery to an increasing degree. The aim of
protection, however, has prevailed to the present day. This sce-
nario means that the elaboration of substantive rules has also
prevailed. Such an attitude was probably justified so long as
banks and politics played a major role in the equity financing of
firms and the markets remained underdeveloped. To cap it all,
the finance industry was also full of cartels.
The evolution of the functioning of markets in the field of
finance and other changes have, however, been remarkable over
the last ten years, and disclosure rules have now come into their
own and become predominant. Some of the changes include:
" Globalization has increased international competition, an
idea now supported by the World Trade Organization
and the General Agreement on Trade in Services Finan-
cial Service Agreement.'
" Internationally and generally accepted accounting stan-
dards have been adopted virtually across the world.
" Stock markets have become increasingly liberated from
their status as state institutions; they are viewed as private,
1. Cf BASLE COMMITEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, COMPENDIUM OF DOCUMENTS
PRODUCED BY THE BASLE COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION APRIL 1997 (visited Sept.
21, 1999) <http://www.bis.org/publ/index.htm> (on file with the Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal).
2. Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERS USE IT (St.
Martins Press 1995).
3. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTs-REsuLTS OF THE URUGUAYAN ROUND
vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994); WTO General Council, Report of the Working Group
on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy to the General Council, WTO Doc.
WT/WGTCP/2 (Dec. 8,1998).
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self-regulating, market organizing bodies, although not
yet in Germany.
" Regulation, though still adopting an overarching view of
"banking" as a universal concept, is approaching the se-
curities business in a separate manner. In Europe, this
regulation is under the English influence. The Invest-
ment Services in the Securities Field Directive 4 ("Invest-
ment Services Directive" or "ISD"), it must be noted, also
covers the provision of investment advice and contains
certain rules of conduct. We speak here of "double rules"
both in contract and in administrative law.
* The new phenomenon of sophisticated derivatives is regu-
lated through both disclosure and substantive rules such
as capital requirements. The instruments are, however,
still considered to contain certain systemic risks, but they
are also recognized as instruments for distributing risks.
* More and more special rules, schemes, and exemptions,
are being created for professional, or "sophisticated," in-
vestors who seem to be able to take care of their own in-
terests. In Switzerland, this development is remarkable.
" New substantive rules are being adopted in the field of
criminal law with a clear focus on market protection,
through controlling the behavior of financial in-
termediaries against insider trading, market manipula-
tions, and money laundering. The emerging criminal law
in the field of finance is still quite a new phenomenon in
Europe.
" Practically all types of investments are currently available
to the public if the necessary explanations and warnings
are given. In Europe, people still seek meaningful-
rather than complete-information. A U.S. memoran-
dum can be so obscure that its reader is not sure if its
main purpose is to provide information or to provide a
basis to defend possible claims if anything goes wrong.
* The above points are set against the background of in-
creasing competition among investment centers. Protec-
tive legislators are no longer able to control their subjects'
investment choices.
4. Council Directive No. 93/22/EEC on Investment Services in the Securities
Field, OJ. L 141/27 (1993), corrected Ay O.J. L 170/32 and O.J. L 194/27 (1993).
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" Although investor protection is key, a consumer protec-
tion movement in the field of finance-including the en-
forcement of straightforward product liability-has not
yet become a major issue.
" The confidence in the investor's judgement and the be-
lief in the efficiency of markets are increasing factors that
influence regulation.
In my view, the above changes mean that disclosure is gaining
more and more momentum. Substantive rules address more or-
ganizational issues. The rules of conduct sail in between.
